In October, China observed its National Day and the traditional Mid-Autumn Festival in the same week. The communists-affiliated media heavily promoted celebration activities in South Mongolia. The school authority organized a series of indoctrination activities. These activities aimed to address backlashes from province-wide language mandates. More than 700 freshmen embraced the Red Army culture through an immersive program called “Retracing the Long March” (He).
The program reinforced progress from “the Month of Ethnic Unity”. Tongliao Mongolian High school practiced major principles on character building: awakening, exposures, and self-conscientiousness. The deputy commandant from a partnering junior military academy kicked off this five-day event. He presented guidons to the student body. Students recognized internal leadership structures with another pinning ceremony (for cadet positions).
First, the class saw the reenactment of the 1931 Zunyi Conference after a short deployment ceremony. This conference was the milestone when Mao reclaimed controls over the failing Red Army. After this, the cadres kicked off themed road marches to recreate the Long March of 1934–1936. The events included the Communist’ maneuvers across snowy mountains and marshes. It further showcased the Battle of Luding Bridge. The communist historians hailed this battle as a heroic moment that was equal to the Battle of The Alamo. Students also practiced combat life-saving drills as well as mine clearance training exercises.
(Photo: The indoctrination activities for freshmen from Tongliao Mongolian High School)
The surging indoctrination campaigns followed along with the aftermath of the #SavetheMongolianlanguage movement. The movement rebelled against the Communists’ educational reform in South Mongolia. This reform further marginalizes the Mongolian culture. It mandated Hanyu ( the language of Han ethnicity 汉语 ) as the primary language of instruction across the public school system in South Mongolia. In response, thousands of students boycott schools to protest. Many school leaders committed self-immolation as the Communists defaulted on their ethnic policies. The fruitless unrest ended with the mass incarceration of dissidents in late September. (Click here to learn more about the Mongolian Revolt)
For decades, the Communists claimed that 56 ethnic groups were members of the same family. This landmark propaganda exerts communists’ dominance through gradual assimilations. Yet, the rising ethnic population intensified the CCP’s insecurity over its fragile controls. According to China’s 2010 population census, 55 ethnic minorities were made up of 113,79 million people. It accounts for a 0.09 percent increase in the total population of Communist China from 2000.
Meanwhile, there was a significant decrease in China’s population under 15 years old. The weighted impact was more marked in the Han ethnicity (Population Reference Bureau ). Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the policy dynamic radically shifted from “gradual subversions” to “deliberate Sinification.” A new motto emerged as a defining characteristic for Xi’s Era: “the Party leads all(党是领导一切的)” (Leibold). The subdued cultural diversity improves the efficacy of state propaganda machines. Weaponized Sinification served as the pillar for their power continuum(Hu). As a powerful reinforcement, Hanyu curricula always remind ethnic minorities to patronize the Communist Party’s sacrifice.
Sinification is an effort to promote Han cultures selectively engineered by the Communist Party . Their exploitation of Han cultures directly correlates to the demographic landscape of China. In 1928, the Communist General Secretary Qu, Qiubai, collaborated with Soviet linguists to radically transform Hanyu at Stalin’s behest. Their goal was to substitute traditional Chinese values with Marxism and Leninism. As a result, Pinyin’s birth segregated the population under the communist’s influence from the Nationalists’ government. Traditional Hanyu symbolized suppressions against the lower cast in the dictionary of Communist propaganda.
The communists further transformed written Hanyu after taking power in 1949. In 1966, they initiated the draconian Cultural Revolution to dissolve potential threats of traditional Han cultures.
Deliberate Sinification catalyzed inherent divides within ethnic groups. As a result, increased security efforts became essential to maintain social stability. The communists resorted to initiatives such as the buddy system between Uyghur and Han families, the Golden Shield Project, and the “Grid Management System.” For instance, Xi allegedly spearheaded Project 6521 to contain dissident activities (Congressional-Executive Commission on China). They contributed any disputes from minorities as sabotage attempts from the separatists.
Besides ethnic cultures, various subcultures came under attack as unpatriotic. With consents from state authorities, little pinks labeled faith groups as erosive cults. The signs of crucifixion were arbitrarily removed due to “safety hazards.” Communist officials took down ancient Mosques and Temples with “promises to remodel” (Lu). Nonetheless, there were efforts to curb the influence of local dialects.
All in all, these incidents are textbook examples of the communists’ modus operandi. They prey on social/cultural divides, and gain leverages through divisions. After harnessing enough momentum, the communists would seek to abolish individual group identities. For example, the social values that differentiate the rich and poor would vanish. Instead, the only quality that separates these people is their levels of dedication towards the communist party.
The Chinese Communist Party is the root cause of the sufferings among ethnic groups and subcultures. Repressive state apparatus are necessary tools to materialize ethnic unity (Hu). For instance, the communists applied mass sterilization to cut the Uyghur birth rate by 60% (Zenz).
Once and for all, more and more Chinese are standing up against these atrocities. On September 15, Miles Guo stated: “One of our Whistleblower Movement supporters from the Ministry of Public Security in China arrived safely in an unnamed country last week. In the future, he will reveal how the CCP/CPC persecuted compatriots and children in Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Hong Kong. We still have hundreds of supporters like him, who will continue to get out of China soon.”
【Author】 Justice Lee, Amber Romano
【Editor】 Dylan King
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【Reference】
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 2009 Annual Report. 2009, www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2009-annual-report.
He, Xiaosong. “通辽蒙古族中学国庆中秋双节期间组织高一新生开展研学实践活动.(Tongliao Mongolian High School Organized incoming freshmen for social engagement activities)” WeChat Official Platform, 2020, mp.weixin.qq.com/s/CQzkmvhBPjw7yafQpFvivA.
(WeChat is a social media product from TENCENT, a NASDAQ traded Chinese corporation controlled by communists.)
Hu, Angang, and Lianhe Hu. “第二代民族政策：促进民族交融一体和繁荣一体 (The Second Generation Policy on Ethnic Minorities: Enhancing Unifications of Ethnic Groups for Prosperities.)” 中国研究服务中心(China Research Service Center), 2011, ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=8299.
(Hu, Lianhe co-authored several whitepapers for the Communist China Government)
Leibold, James. “Hu the Uniter: Hu Lianhe and the Radical Turn in China’s Xinjiang Policy.” Jamestown, 15 Oct. 2018, jamestown.org/program/hu-the-uniter-hu-lianhe-and-the-radical-turn-in-chinas-xinjiang-policy/.
Lu, Xin. “‘Sinicized’ Mosques and Churches Changed Beyond Recognition.” Bitter Winter, 31 Dec. 2019, bitterwinter.org/sinicized-mosques-and-churches-changed-beyond-recognition/.
Population Reference Bureau. “China Releases First 2010 Census Results.” Population Reference Bureau, 2011, www.prb.org/china-census-results/.
Yao, Xinyong. “The observation on Sinification in Mainland China.” 原道(The Original Approach), Feb. 2012, ipfs.ink/e/QmSsn4Va3zWMWLZ2tzw8PpLCgfHYgFv4ZS4PtwguN2o25u.
(原道 is the provincial-grade, quasi-official monthly magazine from Beijing Normal University)
Zenz, Adrian. “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang.” Jamestown, 22 July 2020, jamestown.org/product/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birthrates-in-xinjiang/.
